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Abstract
Dublin experienced a marked stagnation in population growth in the second half
of the nineteenth century, accompanied by decaying infrastructure and poor public
health. Historians have emphasized that this crisis was coupled with poor governance
of the city of Dublin —manifested by eroding public services together with increasing
tax burdens to counteract growing debt. This paper studies the municipal boundary
expansion of Dublin in 1901, which occurred as a way to alleviate the city’s financial
distress. It saw multiple relatively wealthy townships annexed by the city via Royal
order to increase Dublin’s tax base. Using a sample of census records matched to city
streets, we show that wealthy residents and Protestant residents were more likely
to leave annexed areas relative to areas that remained independent. Moreover, we
offer anecdotal evidence that at least some of the wealthy Protestant households
departing annexed townships sorted into jurisdictions that remained independent.
Our findings offer support to arguments that the municipal annexation by the city
of Dublin may have accelerated the decline of annexed areas in the early twentieth
century and contributed to municipal fragmentation in metropolitan Dublin.
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Introduction
The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed a dramatic decline for the city of
Dublin in terms of economy, infrastructure, and public health, which resulted in high
debt (Craft 1970, Daly 1984, and Ó Gráda 1995). Simultaneously, local government was
gaining power (particularly to tax and spend), and without a national government on
home soil, the Dublin municipal government (Dublin Corporation) was also becoming
a key voice of the Nationalist movement in Ireland, largely supported by Catholics
(O’Brien 1982, p 70). In the late nineteenth century, the wide and complicated question
of local government and taxation weighed more heavily on the minds of the residents
of Dublin than any other question of home politics (Pim 1875). Accordingly, it seems
Dubliners, particularly wealthy residents, were becoming increasingly disenchanted with
municipal government politics and high taxation. At the same time, with the Nationalist
political advances and dominance in rulemaking, Protestant residents were gradually
losing control of how their taxes were spent (Brady 2001). Many social historians have
argued that the discontent of these city residents with their local government was a
major factor behind their exodus to the surrounding independent townships, which, in
turn, was a pivotal contributor to the decay of the city of Dublin (O’Brien 1982, Daly
1984, and Prunty 1998).
The decaying infrastructure, worsening public health, and the high debt together with
the shrinking tax base in Dublin would eventually lead the city to expand its boundaries
in 1901 through the annexation of adjacent independent townships. Annexation is a
process that is often argued to strictly benefit annexing cities (poorer) at the expense of
the annexed suburbs (wealthier), as discussed by Filer & Kenny (1980) and modeled by
Ellickson (1971). We take advantage of this unique policy intervention in 1901 to test
residential preferences for municipal independence at the turn of the twentieth century.
The Annexation, which did not require consent by the annexed townships, was initially
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planned to include the northern townships of Clontarf, Drumcondra, Glasnevin, the
western Kilmainham, and the southern Rathmines and Pembroke. The latter two areas
eventually escaped the 1901 annexation, which makes these areas a convenient choice to
use as a control group in our study. By looking at the behavior of households exposed to
this shock, in comparison to our control, we estimate how a change in local government
affects residential choice, revealing preferences over local government.
We employ the returns of the 1901 and 1911 Irish Censuses to construct a household-
level dataset for houses located on the boundaries between three distinct areas of Dublin,
(the city, the annexed townships, and an independent township —these areas represent
16-23 percent of the wards that they are part of). With detailed data on each household
within these three selected areas, not only are we able to compare the residential turnover
within different areas across time, but we are also able to break this down by household
characteristics. The census data is supplemented with housing prices from Thom’s Irish
Almanac and Official Directory.
Using this data, we first test whether household characteristics before the annexation
are more similar to each other in the annexed and independent townships than they are
to the nearby city. This is a way to test whether the city attracts different types of
residents than the townships, in line with the intuitive city/suburbs model presented in
Brueckner (2011), Ch 3. We then use the annexation as a shock, which changes the local
government in some areas, to verify the Tiebout-type hypothesis (1956) that households
vote with their feet, in other words, that wealthy residents and Protestant residents
were fleeing Dublin to escape from the city’s government and its high taxation. Put
differently, we look at the residential reaction (change in area demographic composition)
to the imposed change of local government in the annexed townships and contrast it to
both a township that remained independent and the original city.
The results indicate that wealthy residents and Protestant residents were inclined
to move away from the annexed townships in the period after annexation, and there
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was no such effect in the area that remained independent. Moreover, we offer evidence
of the increase in the inflow of wealthy Protestants into the independent townships at
the same time. This migration supports the idea put forward in the literature: The
desire for lower taxation and/or political autonomy was a factor in the exodus of these
groups from the city of Dublin at the turn of the twentieth century (O’Brien 1982,
Daly 1984, and Prunty 1998). The residential preferences uncovered in this analysis
lend to a better understanding of the evolution of the city of Dublin over the following
century. For example, the fact that the annexation occurred only on the north side of
the city potentially explains the stark differences in development between the north and
south side of the River Liffey (the line that geographically splits the city in two), still
recognizable today. Some implications might be extended to the dozens of British cities
that also annexed around the turn of the twentieth century.
Our paper makes novel contributions on several fronts. First, it is the only study
to address urban exodus and its implications as a direct response to municipal annex-
ation.1 Second, it is also one of only a couple of studies (Dilworth 2005 being the
other) that look at the phenomenon of nineteenth-century residential behavior, in par-
ticular suburbanization, as an outcome of preferences over local government. In Dublin,
nineteenth-century central-city decline was more prominent than in any other city in the
United Kingdom,2 making Dublin the ideal backdrop to study urban residential move-
ment and its outcomes from a historical perspective. Third, this paper is one of the
very few studies to use individual-level data to provide a direct analysis of a migratory
response to local government actions, showing how specific individuals might respond
(move-out, move-in, or stay in a given area). Finally, the paper also contributes to the
field of Irish economic and social history. Scholarly work documents the flight of the
1Although economists have thoroughly studied urban exodus and its implications in the context of
mid-twentieth-century America, to our best knowledge there are no similar studies for mid-nineteenth-
century America when many annexations happened in the east of the country.
2As noted in O’Brien (1982), p 9, in the nineteenth century Dublin faced a population stagnation and
industrial decline, at the same time when cities like Belfast, Bristol, Leeds, Manchester, and Sheffield
encountered industrial growth and population explosion.
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well-off Protestant class from the city in reaction to their dissatisfaction with municipal
government policies and actions, such as the imposition of high property taxes and the
Nationalist political agenda (see Daly 1984 and O’Brien 1982), but does not test this
empirically.
After a description of the process of urbanization, political economy, and the his-
torical background leading up to the annexation, we briefly present the theoretical and
empirical model. We highlight the main features of the data that we use, to engender
the empirical results that follow, and we provide sensitivity checks before concluding.
Dublin’s historical background
To understand the historical background of our research question, we need to highlight
changes happening in Dublin in the second half of the nineteenth century on three levels.
First, we need an understanding of demographic changes (urban decline, suburban rise),
second, the shifting political control and fiscal policy oversight of the city, and finally,
the motivation for the annexation.
General urban decline and suburban growth
In the second half of the nineteenth century, urban infrastructure in the city of Dublin
decayed, public health declined, and the quality of city living fell substantially. The
social history literature investigates why Dublin suffered such a downturn throughout
the nineteenth century and beyond, and in doing so it logically asks why there was a
large movement of wealthier classes away from the city. Dubliners have been known to
simply blame The Act of Union 1800 for their city’s failure to thrive both at the time
and still today (see O’Brien 1910, p 246, and Dickson 2001, p 114).3 However, academic
studies on the urban decline in Dublin instead pinpoint the initial cause of Dublin’s
3The Act of Union 1800 was a legislative agreement uniting Great Britain (England, Wales and
Scotland) with Ireland, in a Union that lasted over one hundred years, ending with the Anglo-Irish
Treaty which was ratified in January 1922.
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decline to the city’s failure to industrialize its economy, leading to limited employment
opportunities (Craft 1970, p 307). Despite the lack of jobs, the city was a magnet for
unskilled rural workers, particularly in years of poor agricultural yield (Ó Gráda 1995, p
250). As a result, Dublin was increasingly becoming a city populated by transient general
laborers at times of downturns (Craft 1970, p 309), which was emphasised by the fact
that Dublin was Ireland’s principal port for imports/exports-related to the agriculture
industry (Daly 1984, p 54).
At the same time, following a growing international trend, upper-class city dwellers
relocated to the fresh and open environs outside of municipal boundaries: The “garden
suburbs” (Harris & Larkham 1999, Ch 4). The innovation in improving modes of trans-
portation made living in the suburbs and working in the city feasible; with horse-drawn
buses and trams linking the suburbs to the city by the 1870s (Craft 1970 and Corcoran
2000). Suburban growth and the related city decline peaked in the latter decades of the
nineteenth century. To illustrate these contrasting trends, Figure 1(a) gives population
figures for the city, two selected wards of the city (Inns Quay and Rotunda), and three
surrounding townships (Clontarf, Drumcondra and Rathmines) in the two Census years
1891 and 1911. The areas displayed in the figure are those that later will become part of
our empirical analysis. Inns Quay and Rotunda [CITY] will be the wards representing
the city; Clontarf and Drumcondra [AT] the areas representing the annexed townships
and ultimately, Rathmines [IT] an area that was not annexed. The figure shows that
in the whole city of Dublin city population grew 24% between 1891 and 1911, mainly
due to the annexation that occurred in 1901; without the annexation, the city remained
relatively stagnant Inns Quay and Rotunda grew mildly (about 10%) indicating that
some wards in the city grew less. By contrast, the suburbs (we interchangeably use the
terms suburb and township as they are both widely used in the related literature) grew
substantially, by about 35% in Rathmines and 80% in Clontarf and Drumcondra.
There was also a drastic change in the city’s occupational structure relative to the
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suburbs (see Table 1). According to the aggregate Census data, in 1891 the suburban
districts had 40.2% of their population in professional- and middle-class occupations,
while Dublin city only had 22.5%. Table 1 presents an index for the representation
of different professional classes in the city as compared to the suburbs in 1881 and
1911 and shows that the suburbs were generally becoming wealthier, while the city was
experiencing the opposite (Daly 1984, p 146).
Worsening public health provisions further exacerbated these trends. With the lack
of a main drainage system and the overcrowding of the poor in the tenement slums
spreading throughout the city, disease was a serious issue. Table 2 illustrates this by
showing high mortality in the city due to zymotic diseases which were thought to be
particularly associated with poverty at that time (33.6 per mille, compared with lower
proportions in all suburbs —as documented in The Housing Report of 1914, PP cd.7317).
Political control and taxation
Over the second half of the nineteenth century, culminating with The Local Government
Act of 1898, there was an immense structural transformation occurring at the local
government level in Ireland, shifting the balance of power and politics in Dublin. Changes
were occurring on multiple levels. New legislation gave Dublin Corporation a wider scope
of responsibilities and powers, particularly in taxation and spending (O’Brien 1982, p
74). Additionally, the right to vote and to hold office was extended to many citizens
previously prohibited, transforming party politics within the Council. By 1898, property
qualifications were fully removed from the regulations for holding office and the municipal
franchise was democratized - broadened to 38,000 electors versus the mere 8,000 allowed
to vote prior.4 Accordingly, Dublin Corporation became increasingly Nationalist (used
4No longer was ownership of the real or personal estate to the amount of £1000 or greater, or
occupancy of city property rated at £25 per annum or above, a requirement for standing in an election.
Regarding the franchise, any rated occupier of property of £10 per annum or greater (including, for the
first time, women), residing in Dublin for a minimum of one year (versus the two years and eight months
regulation previously in place), was allowed to vote.
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interchangeably with Catholic from here forward), and, parallel to this, control was being
handed over to the “small ratepayers” (Pim 1875, p 114) - the so-called “petty business
classes” (Daly 1984, p 207). By 1898, Unionist (used interchangeably with Protestant
from here forward) representation had shrunk to a mere eleven representatives (out of
more than 60).5 It was a dramatic shift from the turn of the nineteenth century when
Catholics (and those with marginal wealth) were not permitted to stand in an election,
and even as late as 1840, when members of the city council continued to be exclusively
Protestant in religion and in favor of the Union, (O’Brien 1982, p 35).
Accordingly, the townships surrounding Dublin held a Unionist majority. Daly (1984)
writes “Like Rathmines, Clontarf retained its strong Unionist complexion until the early
twentieth century”. “The prosperous Protestant upper-class, rather than fight this issue
in the cockpit of municipal politics withdrew to their comfortable suburbs where they
pursued separate interests and separate development” (Daly 1984, p 17).
Wealthy and Protestant residents likely held contrasting values to the new Dublin
Corporation on taxation and provision of local public goods (O’Brien 1982). In 1874
Dublin property tax was 45%, whereas it was much lower in the suburbs (for example
23% and 20% in Clontarf and Rathmines, as shown by (Daly 1984, p 227)).6
After 1900 city taxation was consistently above 50%. Figure 1(b) illustrates the total
taxes in the city versus the suburbs in 1891 and 1911. We observe a sizable rise in the
tax rates of Clontarf and Drumcondra after their annexation and to a less extent in the
independent Rathmines, between the two time periods. High property tax rates affected
mostly owners of large properties (wealthy residents).
The way that taxes were spent is another important determinant on the decision of
certain households to move. Possibly, this affected the decision of Protestants more as,
potentially, they saw this as part of the lost political control (both O’Brien 1982 and
5It should be emphasized that not all wealthy residents and Protestant residents were adamant
supporters of the Union, but many were.
6The tax was calculated based on the annual rent of the property.
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Daly 1984 make this point). The annual expenditure on the relief of the poor in Dublin
had become unsustainable, presenting an enormous burden on taxpayers (O’Brien 1982,
p 74).7 Along with the high cost of maintaining Dublin’s poor houses, the city also bore
a disproportionate burden in terms of hospitals (including morgues and disinfecting
chambers), alms-houses, policing, fire brigade, schooling, and improvement of tenements
and thoroughfare roads (The Housing Report of 1914, PP c.2827). Taxes would only
cover some of the excess costs faced by the Dublin Corporation, partly because not
all users of public services contributed to taxation.8 Borrowing covered the deficit,
leading to the extreme indebtedness of Dublin Corporation, with a debt (£1,399,655) to
revenue (£410,009) ratio of 3.41 in 1894 (PP 7795). The annexation reduced the debt
(£1,876,987) to revenue (£655,395) ratio to 2.86 in 1901 (2.88 in 1904).9
The annexation of 1901
With the worsening of its finances and accumulation of debt, but also to correct the
inequity of free-riding on public services by suburban residents (O’Brien 1982, p 82), in
the latter half of the nineteenth century, Dublin Corporation initiated a movement to
annex the surrounding townships into the city. The proposed legislation was expected
to add 80,000, mainly middle class, residents (around 30 percent of Dublin’s population)
to the city and £350,000 to its valuation in taxable property - an increase of 50 percent.
Not only did it mean an enlargement in the tax base for Dublin, but with expanded
collateral, the city’s borrowing power would also be enhanced.
Township residents adamantly protested the possibility of annexation. They had a
sense of independence and hostility towards the city and its administration.10 A letter
7Such expenditures in North and South Dublin Union combined was over £100,000, nearly three
times that spent in comparably populous Belfast.
8(O’Brien 1982, p 82 reports about 45,000 commuters a day, some of them using the public facilities
of the city (hospitals, fire brigade, markets, libraries, an so on), without contributing to those.
9The Royal Commission on Municipal Boundaries 1880 discusses in great detail the debt structure
of Dublin Corporation (O’Brien 1982, p 76).
10One witness to the Royal Commission on Municipal Boundaries 1880 testified that he had spent
£4,000 on housing in Rathmines and would not have done so if the area was under the control of the
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from township commissioners to the Lord Lieutenant defended their autonomy (Chief
Secretary’s Office Registered Papers, 1885, no 7695):
It would be neither just nor politic that the Government should take up and
lend their powerful assistance to pass a bill of compulsory annexation which
necessarily would prove an Act of spoilation and subjection of a township ...
which has always been loyal and law-abiding and thus assist in furthering the
designs of a body such as the Corporation of Dublin, the majority of whose
members have so recently done all they could dare venture, to parade their
disloyalty to the Crown and Constitution.
Rathmines and Drumcondra provide a useful case study on public opinion as only
the latter was eventually annexed. Circulars were sent out by township commissioners to
gauge opinion on annexation. In Rathmines, 90% of residents were against amalgamation
and the objection was even more marked in Drumcondra (PP c.2827, p 19).
In 1900, legislation was laid down in The Dublin Corporation Act for the annexation
of the highly professional and Protestant northern townships of Clontarf, Drumcondra,
and Glasnevin, and the area west of the city known as Kilmainham. The Act was given
the Royal Assent in August of 1900 and took effect on January 15, 1901. At the last
moment, the southern townships of Rathmines and Pembroke managed to be excluded
from this act and were not annexed to Dublin until 1930.
The reasons Rathmines and Pembroke were able to retain their independence differed
between the two townships. Rathmines had low property rates, reduced public services,
and a low-quality water scheme. The township commissioners saw the initial offer of
accessing the River Vartry water by Dublin Corporation as too expensive and opted for
polluted and low-pressure water from the canals. However, even when Dublin Corpo-
ration offered access to Vartry water at favorable rates, the commissioners rejected the
offer for lower quality water from the river Dodder. Behind these decisions was the fear
highly taxed city, (Royal Commission on Municipal Boundaries, Evidence J.T. Harricks, para 3591).
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that accepting the deal with Dublin Corporation would have meant losing independence.
The fact that the township maintained a majority of Protestants –many having escaped
the city due to hostility towards Catholicism and Nationalism– played a pivotal role in
this decision. Pembroke had a different structure. The Earl of Pembroke owned most
of the township but did not reside there. The policies implemented were often favorable
to his properties, but he would pay them back with generous financial benefits. The
township faced a large number of sanitation problems. Upon pressure from its residents,
it responded by agreeing to use Vartry’s water from the Dublin Corporation and in-
crease sanitation expenditure to the city, while remaining independent from the city.
The township opted not to raise its property rates but, instead, to accumulate debt,
eventually guaranteed by the Earl and wealthy residents. The debt accumulated made
it less appealing to the city, and the presence of control of wealthy Unionists meant it
preferred to retain its independence (for further details, see (Daly 1984)).
The boundary extension occurred in the same year as the enumeration of the 1901
Census. Its passing was quite unexpected, as numerous bills had been brought to the
table over the previous twenty years and failed (Irish Times, January 18, 1900). It
is possible that some residents, anticipating that their taxes would go up, would have
moved before the taking of the census. However, equally, it is also likely that many
did not foresee the annexation. In fact, in 1898, just two years before its passing, a
similar annexation bill was taken before Parliament at great expense, with no success
(Irish Times, January 4, 1900). In 1900 The Irish Times wrote that the passing of
the Dublin Corporation Boundaries Bill at any time in the future was an “improbable
event” (January 18, 1900).
After the annexation, people living in the annexed townships had to pay more than
double the tax rate that they had paid just before the annexation, to a municipal gov-
ernment that they had not chosen to live under. As can be seen in Figure 1(b), over
the years before annexation those townships that were eventually annexed paid, on av-
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erage, approximately the same amount in taxes as those townships that were to remain
independent. It can also be seen in this figure that taxes went up in all areas around
the turn of the twentieth century, which was largely the result of a need for funding for
the elaborate infrastructural projects (mainly drainage) that were taking place at the
time. However, rates went up much more dramatically for the annexed townships than
for other areas, and these annexed areas were now paying taxes to fund the local public
goods of a government that they did not elect to live under.
Many of the larger property owners had threatened to leave as the result of a success-
ful annexation (Irish Times, July 11, 1899). Aggregate statistics on the townships that
became part of the city indicate that certain groups of residents may have been “voting
with their feet” against living under the imposed municipal jurisdiction of Dublin. Fig-
ure 1(c) shows that there was a larger percentage drop in the number of Protestants in
the annexed townships between 1891 and 1911 than in those townships that remained
independent. Finally, Figure 1(d) offers an indication of the relocation of wealth (prox-
ied by the percentage of workers in top jobs), showing that the suburbs Clontarf and
Drumcondra became poorer, while minimal variation took place in Rathmines (and the
city).11
The theoretical and empirical framework
A model of an urban economy where residents can vote with their feet gives the following
predictions. Because of the lost control of the redistribution of tax, Protestant residents
will be more likely to leave the townships after the annexation than the township that
remained independent. Additionally, because of the increased property tax rate wealthy
residents will be more likely to leave the township after the annexation. In Appendix A
we elaborate on this intuition using a consumer locational equilibrium model.
This framework leads us to the following two conjectures.
11Top jobs include: Professions (clerical, legal, medical), teachers, literary and scientific persons,
engineers and surveyors, artists, and persons engaged in exhibitions, shows and games.
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Conjecture 1 Before the annexation, households residing in [AT] and [IT] are expected
to be more similar to one another than to [CITY] households, as the taxation level and
expenditure policies that they had faced were more similar.
Conjecture 1 argues that before the annexation the two suburban areas in our sample
(even if they happen to be on opposite sides of the city, as shown by the three circles
outside the border of the city in Figure 2) are more like one another than to the city
which immediately borders them. Later we investigate this conjecture with appropriate
descriptive statistics, and then support it with a multinomial logit estimation aimed at
comparing the initial residential composition between the area pairs [AT] and [CITY],
and then [AT] and [IT], respectively.
Conjecture 2 Post annexation, the characteristics of the outflow of residents will differ
from the inflow in [AT] but not in [IT]. [CITY] compared with [IT] may also differ but
that is less clear.
The idea conveyed in Conjecture 2 is that, without the annexation in the area of
interest [AT], any outflow of certain types of households would have been offset by an
inflow of similar types, as the preferences for the area would not be expected to change
much. Empirically, we study this by comparing the characteristics of the residents who
move out, with those who move into the annexed townships and juxtapose it with areas
where there was no change in government. The theoretical framework suggests that
wealthy residents and Protestant residents will leave the annexed area because of the
increase in taxation and the lost control of expenditure policies. On the other hand,
the incoming residents who replace them are less likely to be averse to the new local
government and its policies (in other words, they are more likely to be poorer residents
and Catholic residents).
An aspect not included in Conjecture 2 is where departing households relocate to.
The intuition behind our theoretical framework suggests that the area that remained
independent is more likely to absorb these households. By generalizing the concept of
neighborhood, we can state that, in a closed economy, households departing the annexed
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area will relocate to areas that are more similar pre-annexation. Our data do not allow
us to directly test this claim empirically,12 since it only includes three geographical areas
(of the many possible areas households could have chosen to migrate to).
Data
Sources and sample
The effect of the Dublin annexation took hold between the only two years, 1901 and 1911,
for which the records of the Irish Census are available to the public in their entirety.13
We employ the returns of these Irish Censuses to construct a sample of household-level
data for houses located in three distinct areas of Dublin, corresponding to those defined
earlier and further described below.14 We select sample locations based upon their
distance from the original border of the city of Dublin. We focus on households near
the boundaries of our areas of interest to minimize confounding factors. The sample
streets and houses meet the criterion of being in existence (fully built-up) in both 1901
and 1911 Censuses. For each year, we collected data on households residing in houses
on the edge of the Inns Quay and Rotunda wards of Dublin, which had long been a
part of the municipality but which are near the city/suburbs border [CITY]; houses in a
location bordering the city in Rathmines, a township just south of the border of Dublin
that was not annexed in 1901 ([IT]), and houses in another location bordering the city
in Drumcondra and Clontarf, two townships north of the border of Dublin that were
annexed in 1901 ([AT]). See Appendix B for a more detailed discussion. So, for the
12(Berger 2014, chapter 4) looks at where households move to within county Dublin
13Although the aggregate statistics are available for all Irish Censuses, the actual individual returns
are only publicly available (via the National Archives of Ireland) for the years 1901 and 1911. The 1821
through 1851 returns were destroyed in a 1922 fire at the records office of Dublin Castle. The 1861 and
1871 returns were destroyed shortly after they were recorded. The 1881 and 1891 returns were pulped
during World War I, likely due to paper shortages. Following the 1911 Census, the next undertaking
was not until 1926 (the first census was taken after independence) and it will only be released for public
inspection in January 2027, under the restrictions of the ‘one-hundred-year privacy clause’ (although
this was lifted by the Irish Government early for the 1901 and 1911 Censuses).
14The manuscripts for each census year have been scanned and made available to the public via the
website of The National Archives of Ireland. The data has been extracted from this website, using a
program written in R, and put into spreadsheet format.
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selected wards, only streets either bordering or near the border with the city have been
chosen to be part of the dataset. These streets represent 16-23% of the population of the
wards in which they are in and, for these streets, we have information on all households.
The Dublin metropolitan map in Figure 2 shows where the areas described are phys-
ically located. Ideally, we would have liked to compare annexed versus non-annexed
townships that were physically next to one another, but due to the geography of Dublin,
and the fact that only those townships to the north (Clontarf, Drumcondra, Glasnevin)
and west of the city (Kilmainham) were annexed, this was not possible.15 As men-
tioned, all samples examined are directly next to the jurisdictional boundary of Dublin.
Homes on the fringe of the Dublin metropolitan border were generally built in a single
era (the mid-to late-nineteenth century) and as such would have experienced an equal
rate of natural decay. Moreover, all areas had similar modes of transportation in place
for the period studied: By the 1870s each Rathmines, Drumcondra, and Clontarf had
horse-drawn tramlines along their main street leading towards the city center of Dublin,
(Corcoran 2000). The regulated charge for a single trip from the city center to these
townships was equally one shilling (Craft 1970).
For each household in the dataset, we determine whether it is a “stayer”, a “mover-
out” or a “mover-in”, by manually finding the corresponding houses and the residing
individuals across the 1901 and 1911 Censuses. A household is a stayer if at least one
family member lives on the same street in both census years (first, middle and last name,
and age match). It is a mover-out if all family members are only on that street in 1901
and a mover-in if all family members are only on that street in 1911 (see Appendix C for
a more detailed description of this process, including how we addressed the difficulties
such as hand written returns, and varying house numbers).16
15Although one could argue, using the same reasoning as in boundary discontinuity design, that areas
on either side of the entire city boundary are similar enough in terms of externalities and amenities that
issues of unobserved heterogeneity are largely minimized (for example, see Boustan 2013).
16For example, if in 1901 John Carroll 32 and Rose Carroll 28 lived on the street Derrynane Parade;
that household will be identified as stayer if either there was a John Carroll 42 (+/- 1 year) and/or Rose
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The individual returns of the Census contain detailed information on each member
of the household. For this, we can extract the following variables: Religion, occupation,
birthplace, age, number of children under 14, number of children 14 and over, and number
of non-family members living in the household. These can be thought of as potential
control variables for residential choice. The birthplace variable is aggregated into six
categories based upon whether the individual is originally from Dublin City, County
Dublin, another area of Leinster (the province which Dublin is in), wider Ireland, the
U.K., or outside the British Isles. For additional members of the household, we divide the
number of children into two age groups (0-14 and >14) based upon the view that families
with school-age children are bound to behave differently than those with working-age
children when making a residential choice.17 We have also included count indicators
for the number of non-family members living in the household, further broken down by
whether they are boarders, or servants.
For the occupation variable, we first combine similar occupations (some individuals
gave elaborate job descriptions on their Census return form) into job titles that could
be coded under the ‘HISCO’ (Historical International Standard Coding of Occupations)
classification scheme (Van Leeuwen et al. 2002). We convert this classification into a
proxy for income using the HIS-CAM scale, producing values that range from 30 to 100
with a standard deviation of 14.71 (in shorthand we refer to this variable as income),
see Appendix D for details.
Finally, housing prices have been collected from Thom’s Irish Almanac and Official
Directory.18 We have consulted the 1892 and 1912 yearbooks due to their proximity to
Carroll 38 (+/- 1 year) on the same street in 1911. The household is a mover-out if it is on the street in
1901 but neither member is on the street in 1911 and a mover-in if neither John Carroll or Rose Carroll
was on that street (ten years younger +/- 1 year) in 1901.
17The Compulsory Attendance Clauses of the Irish Education Act, 1892 ensured the enforcement of
compulsory education for children between the ages of 6 and 14.
18Thom’s Irish Almanac and Official Directory (Thom’s directory) was first published in 1844 by
Alexander Thom. As highlighted by Hammond (1946) it was the first readily available semi-official
publication to record everything of practical national interest concerning the whole of Ireland. The
inclusion of the Dublin Street Directory began in the year 1852. On the whole, Thom’s Directory is
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the periods of interest and their online availability.19 We utilized the Street Directory
portion of the publication, with information on street and house number, and most
importantly, the ‘rateable valuation’ of the property, which represents a proxy of the
market value of each property, net of property tax.
Descriptive statistics
Our sample consists of 3,257 households over two time periods, 1901 and 1911, with a
total of 15,896 individuals. Table 3 indicates that for 1901, there are 1,516 households
in the entire sample and for 1911 this figure rises to 1,741. As mentioned, in the census
data all houses were observed each year. The increase in households across census years
is put down to the fact that more houses were empty in 1901 and that houses were more
likely to contain more than one household in 1911.
We have been able to collect aggregate information from census returns and analyses
by social historians to test how representative our sample is of the population. Figure 1
(discussed earlier) presents aggregate statistics in four charts showing differences between
the three areas of interest in terms of population, taxation, religion, and an indicator of
wealth —before and after the annexation. For the religion variable, we test the mean
of our sample against the mean of the census return (using a t-test of difference in
means) and find that they are representative of the population, except Inns Quay in
period one and Drumcondra in both periods. In these three exceptions, Protestants are
over-sampled.
The top panel of Table 4 provides a comparison of statistics showing how the areas
differed before the annexation. The t-tests for the difference in means are reported in
the notes of the table.20 We observe that [AT] and [IT] are more similar to one another
revised and published each year. The Directory has since become an “institution” in Irish public and
private life; all of this is compiled into a thick annual book of over 1,000 pages.
19http://griffiths.askaboutireland.ie/gv4/thoms_viewer/thoms_show2.php?id=9583, accessed
on 15 July 2020.
20In the note in Table 4, we show that the difference in means between [AT] and [IT] is often not
significant. Furthermore, when it is significant it is much lower than the difference in means between
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than to [CITY] before the annexation. This is true in terms religion, rental prices, and
income. [AT] and [IT] are more similar in terms of religion before the annexation, with
comparable proportions of their populations reporting as Protestant at 0.41 and 0.51,
respectively. Though this difference is statistically different from zero (t-stat 2.95); its
significance is well below that of the difference between the two townships and [CITY],
where the proportion Protestant is 0.17, with t-stats exceeding nine. The message from
comparing the rental prices (rateable valuation) is much the same, the only difference
being that the t-stat of the difference in means between [AT] and [IT] is not significant.
Finally, when it comes to income, the difference in average HISCAM, 68.23 in [AT],
versus 71.03 in [IT], is well below the difference in average HISCAM, when comparing
with 63.37 in [CITY]. For income too, there is a smaller statistical difference between
the townships (t-stat 2.53) than there is between the townships and [CITY], where the
t-stats are above 6.5. Overall, we find evidence supporting Conjecture 1: The annexed
townships [AT] and the independent township [IT] are more similar to one another than
to the city [CITY].
Comparing the the top and bottom panel of Table 4 shows how the areas changed over
time. We observe that heads of household are becoming older and there are fewer young
children, a lower number of servants and - for most of the locations - fewer boarders. For
the religion variable, the proportion reporting as Protestant in the annexed townships
drops from 0.41 to 0.34 after the annexation, and is highly significant. There is also a
decline in the Protestant group between the two periods in the independent township,
but it is not statistically significant. As for the other variable of interest, income, we
observe that in the annexed townships (and the city) income drops significantly, while
it rises (though not significantly) in the independent townships.
Here the statistics are supportive of Conjecture 2: The annexed townships become
less wealthy and less Protestant after the annexation, while the independent township
both [AT] and [CITY] and [IT] and [CITY].
18
remains relatively stable.
Multinomial logit and probit results
The goals of this section are to further verify the two conjectures using a multivariate
approach
We first verify Conjecture 1 with a multinomial logit estimation where the annexed
townships (the reference category) are compared against the other two areas. This
methodology is preferred to a simple difference in means of characteristics as it allows
to draw an overall conclusion on the joint effect of the variables of interest. It provides
a unique statistic from which to draw conclusions on Conjecture 1 after controlling for
various covariates of interest. The results are reported in Table 5. The first column of
the table compares [CITY] to [AT]; the second column compares [IT] to [AT].
The point estimates in Table 5 show that before the annexation, differences exist on
more levels between [CITY] and [AT], than between [IT] and [AT]. Households in the
city are in lower-paying occupations than those in the annexed townships on average,
whilst income levels are not statistically different between the independent and annexed
townships. Significant differences also exist between [CITY] and [AT] with regards to
the age of head of household (younger in the city); the number of children aged 14 and
under (more in the city); the number of boarders (more in the city); and the number of
household heads born in the suburbs and greater Ireland (less in the city). No significant
differences exist between [IT] and [AT] for the aforementioned variables. However, both
[CITY] and [IT] differ from [AT] with regards to religious composition. Households
in [CITY] are less likely to be Protestant than those in [AT], while households in [IT]
are more likely. Compared with [AT], households in [CITY] have fewer servants, while
households in [IT] have more.
We judge the overall similarities of the alternative locations based upon the value
of the Wald test for the joint significance of the coefficients. As can be seen from the
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bottom of the table, the results are supportive of Conjecture 1, with the Wald test
statistic higher in the first column than in the second: Households in the two township
locations, [AT] and [IT], do have more similar preferences to one another before the
annexation shock than do households in areas [AT] and [CITY]. This result is in line
with the city/suburbs model discussed in Brueckner (2011) as the townships are more
similar to one another than to the proximate city, even though they themselves are not
geographically close. Later on, we discuss how to refine this group using propensity score
matching.
In Table 6 we present the marginal effects of a probit model for the three areas of
interest. We define the binary dependent variable to be one if a household moves in, and
zero if a household moves out between the two periods. The subsample of households
that stay in both periods, in other words the panel component, are not included in this
regression. By comparing households that leave with those that move in, we focus on
the turnover of types of households.
Columns (1)-(3) show the results for each of our three main areas [CITY, AT, IT]. The
coefficients of income and Protestant are not significant for [IT], while they are significant
and negative for [AT] (and [CITY]). This result confirms Conjecture 2: In the annexed
area (but also in the city) wealthy residents and Protestant residents are more likely to be
replaced by less wealthy residents and non-Protestant (Catholic) residents. We also note
that the regression for [IT] is not significant overall, as can be seen via the magnitude
of the Wald test p-value. This suggests that in the non-annexed area households are,
on average, replaced by households with similar (observable) characteristics. For [AT],
the Wald statistic is rejected, suggesting a change in the composition of households in
the annexed area. Income and religion contribute to this. These estimates do not show
where wealthy residents and Protestant residents relocate to. Using the coefficients from
column (2) of Table 6 for [AT], we can work out the marginal effect of income (fixing all
variables at their mean value, including religion). A representative Protestant household
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has about a 10% higher probability of leaving the area (versus entering) relative to a
representative Catholic household. Looking beyond the averages, Table E.1 shows that
rich Protestants are about 20% more likely to leave the area than a poor Catholic.21
Furthermore, both rich Catholics and poor Protestants are around 10% more likely
to leave than a poor Catholic household. These results, along with the result of no
significant effect of income and religion for [IT], verify the main conjecture of this paper.
Wealthy residents and Protestant residents in annexed locations did “vote with their
feet” against the Dublin Corporation.
To look into the further effects of the annexation, we conducted a set of Monte Carlo
simulations, which are presented in detail in Appendix E. The idea of these simulations
is to demonstrate how income distribution changed in the relevant areas between 1901
and 1921. As such, the credibility of these findings hinges on the assumption that
the model estimated using data from the first decade of the twentieth century can be
extrapolated to the period 1911-21. This latter decade was a tumultuous time in the
history of Dublin with events (the 1913 Lockout, the 1916 Rising, and the 1919-21 War
of Independence) likely to have further exacerbated the exodus of wealthy residents and
Protestant residents from [CITY]. As we do not control for the effect of these events
(simply due to the lack of data), our simulation results provide an understanding of
the level of the exodus that would have taken place without the events of 1911-21.
Consequently, these findings can be thought of as a lower bound of the changes in the
composition of the resident population.
There is a noticeable religion effect: The likelihood that a Protestant family relocates
to [AT] is more than 12 percent lower than for Catholic households, all else equal. Figure
4 (a), shows, for [AT] that between 1901 and 1921 the population of Protestants in the
area would drop by 5 percentage points due to their exodus. Figure 4 4 (b) shows, for
[AT], the predicted changes for five quintiles of income. The model predicts that between
21We defined poor as a household belonging to lowest income quintile, and the rich as belonging to
the fifth quintile.
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1901 and 1921 the very richest part of the population drastically reduces its presence in
the [AT], whereas the poorest and second poorest group increase their shares by about
4 percentage points each. This is evidence that the annexed area becomes poorer and
more Catholic, arguably due to the effect of preferences over local government politics
(taxation and expenditures).
Moving on to our regression results for [CITY] (Table 6, Column 1), the effects
of income and religion are similar to those discussed for [AT].22 Our interpretation is
that the higher taxation, changing political landscape, and impoverishment that had
originated in the city years before, had not terminated its effect by 1911 - the outflow
of wealthy residents and Protestant residents continued. The annexed townships have
responded to the annexation shock and moved towards the transition that the city was
already in, at least in terms of religion and income demographics. Similar to [AT],
[CITY] also became older. Households with boarders, and households originating from
Leinster and the UK outside of Ireland have a reduced likelihood of moving into [CITY],
all else equal. If we think of boarders as being an alternative indicator of income, these
results offer further confirmation that the city was still amid economic decline. The
non-significance of boarders for [AT] could be due to households with boarders having
the possibility of passing on the increase in taxation (or part of it) to the boarders, and
therefore being less exposed to a sudden increase in taxation. The fact that non-Irish
were choosing to move away from central Dublin fits well with the story that those loyal
to the Crown were put off by the increasing nationalism of the Dublin Corporation.
An interesting question that we have yet to address is whether or not wealthier
Protestants have distinct preferences over local government, which would lead them to
react to the annexation differently than other residents. So far, we have seen the effect
of income for a given religion, and of religion for a given income. With an interaction
term between income and religion we allow for the effect of religion on the area turnover
22The ratio of the two effects for each location is virtually identical, implying that magnitudes for each
effect are similar across the two areas.
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to vary by income. The marginal effects are displayed in columns (4)-(6) of Table
6. For [AT] the interaction term is not significant, and the results of the regression
remain unchanged from those described earlier.23 On average, the annexation had not
motivated Protestant residents who were wealthier to exit (relatively to moving in) from
[AT] more than Protestant residents who were not as well-off financially. Another way
of interpreting this finding is that wealthy Catholics were just as likely to leave [AT] and
[CITY] as wealthy Protestants.
Focusing on the marginal effects for [IT], we find evidence that wealthier Protestants
were moving into the area that remained independent from Dublin, which fits well with
the background story that the “Protestant Ascendency” preferred the political autonomy
offered by the suburbs. It is not surprising that this becomes more apparent for the still
independent township in the period after the annexation when alternatives were limited.
It is also interesting to consider what the estimated preferences against the municipal
government of the city of Dublin imply about the evolution of the different areas over
the decades following the annexation. More specifically: What would have happened to
[IT] had it been annexed to the city, as was proposed in the original Bill of 1900? Would
wealthy residents and Protestant residents have “moved out to the Dublin mountains
(just south of Dublin) and left the townships to the commonality”, as suggested by an
opinion column published in the Irish Times (August 4, 1900), amongst many other
sources?
To answer this question we return to simulations. It can be seen in Figure 4 (c) that
[IT] started with a higher proportion of Protestants than [AT] (top panel (a)) and had
they been annexed that proportion would have dropped off at a much quicker rate than
occurred in the annexed townships. As for income (Figure 4 (d)), the wealthiest group
would have dropped dramatically, to an even greater extent than the annexed townships.
For the other income groups, the pattern is much similar to the annexed townships.
23We have used the package inteff, written for Stata by Norton et al. (2004) to test for the significance




So far, we have included houses from two of the annexed townships, Drumcondra and
Clontarf, grouped to comprise the annexed townships. Each of these two areas were first
established as townships in the same ten year period (1869-1879); Dublin was imme-
diately accessible to them both, as each border the city to the north, and each pays a
virtually equivalent rate of taxation. Still, since the two areas are geographically and ju-
risdictionally distinct, we also run an alternative analysis with Drumcondra and Clontarf
as separate entities, to assess whether residential behavior varies across the annexed area
(see Appendix B for a more detailed discussion). We decompose the annexed townships
into [AT1] (Drumcondra) and [AT2] (Clontarf).
The results, displayed in Table B.1 in the appendix, show that said effects are much
stronger for the residents of Drumcondra and on its own, there is no effect of income
and religion for Clontarf.
In researching potential explanations for these findings, we find that the two incorpo-
rated areas were quite distinct in a major respect. Many of the residents of Clontarf had
petitioned for annexation, whilst every other township was emphatically against it. The
Report of the Royal Commission on Municipal Boundaries published in 1881, provides
a telling story of Clontarf’s plight for inclusion in the proposed boundary extension.
The report details the investigation by the Commission, in which the Dublin Corpora-
tion made clear that they did not wish to invite Clontarf to join the city. The Clontarf
Township Commissioners were themselves against annexation; it was the ratepayers who
supported joining the city of Dublin. During the debate, the Commission received a peti-
tion from a large number of Clontarf ratepayers. Over 400 people, representing one-fifth
of the rateable valuation of the township, stated that they wished to be brought in.24
The reason for this support for the annexation simply came down to necessity: Despite
24Source: Irish Times, July 3, 1900.
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the prognosis of higher taxation, the public services gained from amalgamating Clon-
tarf with Dublin outweighed its cost. Moreover, historically, Clontarf was associated
with poor quality of air/water, prostitution, and polluting industries. This exercise has
proven meaningful as a check on whether different attitudes towards annexation between
the annexed townships played a role in determining the effects of annexation. The fact
that residents in Drumcondra were averse towards the annexation and not much those in
Clontarf has proven a determinant on the decision of certain types of residents to leave
the area. A more elaborate discussion of this result is presented in Appendix B.
Movers relative to stayers
An alternative way to show evidence of Conjecture 2 is comparing the households that
move-in (move-out) with those that remained in [AT] and [IT]. In this way, movers
are compared to stayers, with different types of moves being separated into different
regressions. Table E.2 in the appendix shows the estimates of the separate regressions.
The richness of this comparison is that, relatively to the stayers, households that move
into [AT] are, all else equal, less likely to be wealthy and Protestant, while this effect does
not hold for the area that remained independent. Instead, when we shift the analysis
to households that moved out, there is not such a difference in terms of religion and
income. This is suggestive that the response to annexation is more apparent in terms of
who moves into the area than of who moves out of the area. We then add the interaction
effect between religion and income to study what happens to the wealthy Protestants.
The results suggest that wealthy Protestants are more likely to relocate to an area that
remained independent.
Matching [AT] and [IT] households
As an additional robustness check, we study what would have happened if the suburbs
instead of just being more similar to one another than to the city, actually had the same
demographics, in other words, as though we have available a treatment and control
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group. Based on the same covariates used in the various regressions, for the initial
period we calculate the propensity score where the dependent variable takes value one
if the observation is from [AT] and zero if it is from [IT], and retain the observations
that share common support based on a 5 and 95% interval.25 For this subsample, for
[AT] and [IT], we rerun the estimates documented in Table 6 and find that the effects
of income and religion do not change much (see Table E.3 in the appendix), confirming
the robustness of our original results.
The role of rental prices
The theoretical model presented in Appendix A shows that rental prices are an important
determinant of where to locate. We have so far omitted prices from the analysis because
in collecting this data we came across non-random missing values. This is particularly
the case for the year 1901 and the area of Rathmines since we proxy for 1901 by using
the 1892 Thom’s Directory when some of the properties were still under construction. In
this section, we add the observed prices and repeat the regressions reported in Tables 5
and 6. The estimated effects of these new regressions are given in Tables E.4 and E.5 in
the appendix. The results are much the same and Conjecture 1 holds even more tightly.
We use Thom’s Directory year 1892 as a proxy for the rateable valuation (net of tax
prices) in the year 1901; we use Thom’s Directory year 1912 as a proxy for the year 1911
as these are the closest directories available online. For both periods we have filled in
the values using the Directories if they were listed. For houses that have been divided
into sections, we divided the price by the number of sections. For example, if house 3
was valued as £10 and was recorded as divided in houses 3.1 and 3.2 in the 1911 census,
we have divided the registered value by two and valued them as £5 each. If the value
for a house is not listed in one Directory but is in the other, we assumed that the value
25A probit regression on this subsample (and the same set of covariates) indicates that there is no
difference between the two areas (p-value joint χ2 is 0.218) and therefore confirms the similarity of the
two areas pre-annexation.
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did not change and replaced the missing information with the available value.
A comparison of the average house price in the three areas in 1892 suggests that prices
in the city were far lower than in both the townships to be annexed and the township that
remained independent (£9.41 [CITY], £17.25 [AT], and £18.92 [IT]). Also, we observe
that the average price dropped in 1912 relative to 1892 in [CITY] (from £9.41 to £7.9)
and in [AT] (from £17.25 to £16.42) but rose in [IT] (from £18.92 to £23.33). The
positive change in prices in [IT] is what we expected in line with our analysis. However,
it must also be considered that new houses were built in the independent township and
those may have contributed to the large rise in the rateable valuation. As the use of
the 1892 Directory to proxy for 1901 prices meant that some houses in our data set had
not yet been developed (particularly in Rathmines), we are unable to directly compare
the rateable valuation by street and house number in Rathmines. The only possible
comparison is for houses that are inhabited by stayers (as we can assume that they were
in the same houses even if the number had changed); for this group of houses, prices have
increased from an average of £21.91 in 1892 to £29.43 in 1912, which is quite dramatic.
Finally, Figure 5 shows how the empirical distribution of rateable valuation has changed
during the two time periods and three areas. [CITY] and [AT] share a similar pattern,
while this is not the case for [IT].
Disregarding middle names in defining stayers and movers
Census data do not have identifiers to match households over time. Additionally, several
houses changed number between the 1901 and 1911 censuses, making matching of houses
non-reliable. In this situation, we opted for matching households using information on
household members, the street they reside, their full name, and their age between the
two periods.
As robustness check on our method of finding corresponding names across the two
time periods to identify stayers, we inspect how reliable this technique is by using a
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shorter version of the name without middle name (24% of the sample has a middle name).
Thus, omitting the middle name can, potentially, increase the number of households that
we record as stayers. For example, if there is a Mary Frances Delaney age 30 in 1901 on a
street and Mary Theresa Delaney age 40 in 1911 on the same street, we would mistakenly
record Mary Frances Delaney’s family as stayer. Alternatively, if Mary Frances Delaney
reports her full name in one census, but only reports Mary Delaney in the other census,
then we will have mistakenly recorded her as a mover in/out when she is actually a
stayer.
This modified pairing method with no middle names identifies the same stayers apart
from one observation. Though this robustness check confirms the number of stayers (and
leavers) in our samples, we cannot fully rule out that we may identify as stayers, house-
holds with members having the same name and age and living in the same street between
the two time periods but being different households. There are very few instances of
stayers that have the same name, surname, and age but live in different house numbers
between the two periods. Since this feature happens only on certain streets, and because
house numbers have changed on some streets between the two periods, our pairing seems
to be superior to one where we rely on house numbers being the same between the two
time periods.
Conclusion
The turn of the twentieth century witnessed a substantial change in UK cities, as wealthy
residents were leaving urban centers and opting for homes in the surrounding suburbs.
This movement was particularly pronounced in Dublin.
In 1901 the city of Dublin annexed some of its surrounding townships. We have
used the annexation as a shock to empirically verify the claims put forward in the social
history literature that Protestants responded to the loss of government control, and the
wealthy responded to the increase in taxation by leaving the annexed townships. We
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have compared these residential patterns in the annexed townships to a township that
remained independent and to the original city. The analysis has shown that before the
annexation the demographic composition of the two areas affected by the annexation
was similar to that which remained independent. Following the annexation, wealthy
households and Protestant households were more likely to move away from the annexed
townships than to move in, while there was no significant effect for the independent
township. The Tiebout (1956) idea that households “vote with their feet” over local
government issues, through their decision of where to reside, is illustrated by these
results.
The finding that the more prominent residents of the city were exiting in this man-
ner, brings into question whether or not the annexation, which was supposed to create
economic growth for the city of Dublin, may have been detrimental. Along these lines,
one can imagine how the structure of Dublin as it stands today may have been partly
shaped by past preferences over local government, and particularly by the annexation it-
self. For example, would the north side of the city have been less plagued by the poverty
that it experienced in the twentieth century had the annexation not uniquely occurred
in that part of town? Similar issues are likely relevant to British cities that annexed in
Victorian times, and a comparative investigation would certainly be worthwhile.
The paper also provided evidence on several related questions. For example, we have
found that wealthy residents and Protestant residents were prompted to move away
from the annexed townships in reaction to the imposed municipal government. We
find empirical evidence that the wealthiest of the Protestant group, were more likely to
relocate to independent areas than the less well-off Protestants. Anecdotally, we can link
this movement to the corresponding departure of wealthy and/or Protestant residents
from the annexed areas. This last finding is in line with the story told in the social
history literature.
Two further outcomes of the study should be highlighted here. Firstly, for the area of
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the city that we studied, income and religion had an effect similar to that in the annexed
townships, wealthier and Protestant households moved away. It is easy to imagine that
this city area was still undergoing a residential transition that had been underway since
the municipal government of Dublin had begun its facelift from an almost ceremonial
Protestant/conservative group of elites to a powerful Nationalist institution. Secondly,
for part of the annexed area, the township of Clontarf, we find that wealthy residents
and Protestant residents did not “vote with their feet” against the imposed Dublin
Corporation, likely due to different preferences for local government amenities.
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Table 1: Index of professional occupations
1881 1911
City Suburbs† City Suburbs†
Bank Clerks 56.40 214.20 34.40 300.50
Barristers 101.24 96.75 67.90 198.10
Civil Service 79.40 153.90 87.80 137.30
Gentlemen 45.80 241.70 33.40 303.70
Physicians 88.40 130.30 93.46 120.00
Solicitors 81.10 149.50 41.98 277.40
Source: Daly (1984, p 146). Notes: †Suburbs include, Black-
rock, Clonliffe, Clontarf, Drumcondra, Glasnevin, Glasthule,
Kilmainham, Kingstown, Pembroke, Rathgar and Rathmines.
Clontarf and Drumcondra are part of the city in 1911.
Table 2: Differential mortality rates
1899 All Causes Zymotic
Total city 33.6 5.4
Total suburbs 20.7 2.4
Individual suburbs:
Clontarf and Howth 19.8 3.4
Coolock and Drumcondra 18.0 1.7
Finglas and Glasnevin 19.3 3.8




Source: PP cd.243. Notes: Deaths per 1,000 living in popula-
tion. The table also compares mortality rates due to “zymotic
diseases” which were thought to be particularly associated with
poverty at that time.
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Notes: Movers are implicitly outward
movers in 1901 and inward movers in 1911.
The lack of correspondence between stayers
in two periods is often due to a missing head
of household in 1901 and a young member
of the family becoming head of household
in 1911. This table counts the households
based on the number of head of households.
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Table 4: Sample summary statistics by area
Inns Quay & Rotunda [CITY] Clontarf & Drumcondra [AT] Rathmines [IT]
Year 1901
Mean std Mean std Mean std
rateable valuation† 9.41 5.38 17.25 8.39 18.92 15.90
income 63.37 12.18 68.23 13.89 70.87 17.33
Protestant 0.17 0.38 0.41 0.49 0.51 0.50
age of head 43.42 12.96 46.91 13.96 47.19 13.30
N children ≤14 1.55 1.98 1.21 1.69 1.23 1.76
N children >14 0.91 1.38 1.08 1.55 0.91 1.43
servants 0.06 0.27 0.28 0.60 0.66 0.95
N. boarders 0.48 1.22 0.33 0.92 0.43 0.99
county 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.31
province 0.31 0.46 0.19 0.39 0.23 0.42
Ireland 0.16 0.37 0.27 0.44 0.25 0.43
UK 0.08 0.28 0.14 0.35 0.09 0.28
other location 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.16
Year 1911
rateable valuation 7.90a 4.60 16.42c 7.98 23.33a 18.32
income 60.90a 11.29 66.56b 13.96 71.18 17.15
Protestant 0.11a 0.31 0.34a 0.47 0.46 0.50
age of head 46.98a 14.58 48.19c 14.51 50.42a 14.77
N children ≤14 1.16a 1.66 1.07 1.68 1.01c 1.62
N children (>14) 0.96 1.46 0.99 1.60 0.94 1.45
servants 0.04 0.19 0.24 0.66 0.57 0.93
N. boarders 0.31a 0.89 0.29 0.82 0.49 1.15
county 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.16b 0.37
province 0.24a 0.43 0.19 0.39 0.24 0.43
Ireland 0.17 0.38 0.29 0.45 0.24 0.43
UK 0.05a 0.21 0.10b 0.30 0.09 0.28
other location 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.16
Notes: Bottom panel (Year 1911) includes whether there is significance difference between means in year 1901 and year 1911
ap<0.01, bp<0.05, cp<0.1. †Accessing 1892 rather than 1901 Thom’s Directory has the disadvantage of creating missing
values in 1901. This was particularly the case for Rathmines since four of the streets were built between 1892 and 1901,
causing about 200 missing values, which may explain the significant difference in rateable valuation between the two time
periods for Rathmines. T-stats of difference in means for the year 1901 (the order is the same of the coefficients in the table,
the first is rateable valuation, the second is income, . . .): ([AT]-[CITY]: 18.14, 6.54, 9.33, 4.21, -3.04, 1.94, 8.67, -2.27, 1.19,
-4.56, 3.93, 3.16, 0.33); ([IT]-[CITY]: 8.76, 7.51, 11.02, 4.22, -2.60, 0.10, 12.38, -0.69, 2.69, -2.53, 3.04, 0.26, 1.72); ([IT]-[AT]:
1.51, 2.53, 2.95, 0.41, 0.14, -1.72, 7.08, 1.66, 1.76, 1.69, -0.43, -2.76, 1.50)
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N children <14 0.070* 0.019
(0.036) (0.041
N children ≥ 14 -0.018 -0.054
(0.050) (0.051)
N servants -1.128*** 0.634***
(0.243) (0.120)














pseudo R2 0.111 0.111
χ2(12) 154.030*** 71.880***
χ2(2)† 57.240*** 7.150**
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1. † Joint test coefficients of income and
Protestant are zero.
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Table 6: Probit estimation marginal effects (1=family moved in, 0=family moved out)
[CITY] [AT] [IT] [CITY]† [AT]† [IT]†
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
income -0.004*** -0.003*** 0.001 -0.004*** -0.003*** 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Protestant -0.140** -0.103*** -0.055 -0.133** -0.103*** -0.055
(0.055) (0.033) (0.044) (0.056) (0.033) (0.044)
income×Prot -0.004 0.003 0.005**
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
age 0.004** 0.001 0.004** 0.004** 0.001 0.004**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
family relation:
N children (≤14) -0.018 0.000 -0.003 -0.017 -0.000 -0.003
(0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013)
N children (>14) -0.020 -0.022* -0.018 -0.020 -0.022* -0.018
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015)
N servants -0.088 -0.036 -0.047* -0.091 -0.034 -0.051*
(0.076) (0.030) (0.028) (0.076) (0.030) (0.028)
N boarders -0.047** -0.002 0.025 -0.046** -0.002 0.026
(0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018)
place of origin:
suburb -0.024 -0.013 0.112* -0.023 -0.018 0.102
(0.081) (0.062) (0.062) (0.080) (0.062) (0.063)
province -0.169*** 0.004 0.030 -0.166*** 0.003 0.042
(0.046) (0.043) (0.055) (0.046) (0.043) (0.055)
other Ireland -0.043 0.036 -0.043 0.033 0.042
(0.052) (0.039) (0.054) (0.052) (0.039) (0.054)
UK -0.176** -0.058 0.066 -0.176** -0.054 0.070
(0.078) (0.053) (0.074) (0.078) (0.054) (0.074)
other -0.174 0.123 0.050 -0.186 0.126 0.052
(0.170) (0.128) (0.118) (0.172) (0.128) (0.120)
observations 761 1,113 666 761 1,113 666
pseudo R2 0.053 0.018 0.018 0.053 0.020 0.022
P-val Wald χ2 test 0.000 0.008 0.215 0.000 0.008 0.135
Specif link test‡ ok ok ok ok ok ok
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. †The partial effect and
standard error of income, Protestant and income×Protestant have been computed manually. ‡‘ok’ means
that the model is correctly specified: Prediction is significant and prediction squared is not (linktest
in stata).
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(a) Population* (b) % housing tax rate**
(c) % Protestants*** (d) % workers top jobs***
Notes: *Source: Irish Census Reports. From 1901 Dublin City’s population is inclusive
of the annexed townships Clontarf, Drumcondra, and Kilmainham. The population of
this latter was 8,783 in 1901 and 9,630 in 1911. **Due to information limitation, the year
1891 is the actual year 1881 for The City (recovered from Parliamentary Paper, c. 2827,
p. 4) and it is the year 1894 for the townships (obtained from Parliamentary Paper, c.
7795, p. 56); the year 1911 is the actual year 1910 (recovered from Parliamentary Paper,
cd. 5091). Note that in 1911 Clontarf and Drumcondra have the same tax rate as the
city due to annexation. ***Source is Irish censuses reports. [CITY]=Relevant part of
the city; [AT]=Annexed townships; [IT]=independent township.
Figure 1: Aggregate summary statistics
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Source of map template: American Geographical Society Library, University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee Libraries.
The original boundary of Dublin is represented by the circular ring (roughly following the
canals) around the concentrated center. Both the annexed and the independent town-
ships are located just outside of that ring. The colored ellipses represent the approximate
areas of the sample.












Figure 3: Income proxy for the year 1901
Note: The figure plots the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of the income proxy
(occupation ranking in its quasi-continuous form) for the three areas in period one.
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(a) [AT]: proportion Protestants (b) [AT]: income proxy dynamics (1=poorest,
5=wealthiest)
(c) [IT]: proportion Protestants (d) [IT]: income proxy dynamics (1=poorest,
5=wealthiest)





Notes: Kernel density of rateable valuation for houses built in 1892 (proxy for 1901) and
1912 (proxy for 1911) in [CITY], [AT] and [IT]. Source: Thom’s Directory.
Figure 5: Rateable valuation (net price) distribution in 1901 and 1911 by area
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